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Abstract. Agro-biodiversity can provide natural insurance to risk-averse farmers
by reducing the variance of crop yield, and to society at large by reducing the uncer-
tainty in the provision of public-good ecosystem services such as e.g. CO2 storage.
We analyze the choice of agro-biodiversity by risk-averse farmers who have access
to ﬁnancial insurance, and study the implications for agri-environmental policy de-
sign when on-farm agro-biodiversity generates a positive risk externality. While
increasing environmental risk leads private farmers to increase their level of on-farm
agro-biodiversity, the level of agro-biodiversity in the laissez-faire equilibrium re-
mains ineﬃciently low. We show how either one of two agri-environmental policy
instruments can cure this risk-related market failure: an ex-ante Pigouvian subsidy
on on-farm agro-biodiversity and an ex-post compensation payment for the actual
provision of public environmental beneﬁts. In the absence of regulation, welfare
may increase rather than decrease with increasing environmental risk, if the agro-
ecosystems is characterized by a high natural insurance function, low costs and large
external beneﬁts of agro-biodiversity.
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While private farmers manage agro-ecosystems primarily for the direct ecosystem
services they provide (e.g. crop yield), it is by now widely acknowledged that agro-
ecosystems provide numerous ecosystem services as joint products, including e.g. the
regulation of pests, diseases, water runoﬀ, CO2 storage, or landscape conservation
(OECD 2001, Heal and Small 2002). Typically, these regulating and cultural services
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005) have the characteristics of public goods.
Both private and public ecosystem services are strongly inﬂuenced by on-farm agro-
biodiversity.
One important dimension of the use of agro-biodiversity by farmers, and the pri-
vate and public beneﬁts associated with it, is the risk-dimension. The management
of various risks is traditionally one of the main challenges in agriculture. Farmers
face a wide variety of production and marketing risks, including stochasticities in
weather, pests, diseases or market prices. As a result, farming income is highly un-
certain. Two major strategies for risk-averse farmers to hedge their income risk are
(i) to grow a diverse portfolio of crop species and varieties as a form of natural in-
surance and (ii) to buy ﬁnancial insurance.1 While (i) is a very traditional low-tech
and low-capital strategy that is still widely used in many regions of the world where
ﬁnancial and insurance markets are not existent or not yet well developed, strategy
(ii) is growing in importance as farmers have better access to ﬁnancial and insur-
ance markets and ﬁnancial and insurance services are being developed speciﬁcally
for farmers, such as e.g. crop yield insurance or weather index insurance schemes
(World Bank 2005).
With global environmental change, environmental risks are increasing (IPCC
2007, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, UNEP 2007). For example, in many
regions of the world the statistical distribution of rainfall, storms or temperature
is spreading due to global climate change, leading to a higher variance and to a
higher number of extreme events. Also, the ecological risks of pests and diseases are
increasing due to an increase in the introduction of alien species.
In this paper, we study how such increasing environmental risks can be man-
aged by farmers through on-farm agro-biodiversity and ﬁnancial insurance from the
market. We analyze the implications for individually and socially optimal agro-
biodiversity management and policy design when on-farm agro-biodiversity gener-
ates a positive externality on society at large in terms of positively inﬂuencing the
1A third strategy, which is not explicitly considered here, is the use of risk-reducing inputs
into the agricultural production process, such as e.g. irrigation, fertilizer, pesticides, or enhanced
(through breeding or genetic modiﬁcation) varieties.
2statistical distribution of public-good ecosystem services.
There is broad evidence in economics and ecology that agro-biodiversity has
a natural insurance function concerning both private and public agro-ecosystem
services. Several empirical studies have shown that higher agro-biodiversity may
increase the mean level, and decrease the variance, of crop yields and farm income
(Smale et al. 1998, Schl¨ apfer et al. 2002, Widawsky and Rozelle 1998, Zhu et al.
2000, Di Falco and Perrings 2003, 2005, Di Falco et al. 2007). This result is also
supported by recent theoretical, experimental and observational research in ecology
about the role of biodiversity for the provision of ecosystem services (Hooper et al.
2005, Kinzig et al. 2002, Loreau et al. 2001, 2002). It has been conjectured that
risk-averse farmers use crop diversity in order to hedge their income or consumption
risk (Birol et al. 2006a, 2006b, Di Falco and Perrings 2003). Since agro-biodiversity
provides natural insurance to risk-averse farmers, they tend to employ a higher
level of agro-biodiversity in the face of uncertainty (Baumg¨ artner 2007, Quaas and
Baumg¨ artner 2008).
Instead of making use of natural insurance, farmers can also buy ﬁnancial in-
surance to hedge their income risk. Since agro-biodiversity as a form of natural
insurance and ﬁnancial insurance from the market are substitutes for an individ-
ual risk-averse farmer, improved access to the latter drives out the former (Ehrlich
and Becker 1972, Baumg¨ artner 2007, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner 2008). Indeed, the
extent to which farmers rely on agro-biodiversity as a natural insurance is found
to be aﬀected by agricultural policies such as subsidized crop yield insurance or
direct ﬁnancial assistance (Di Falco and Perrings, 2005). Some studies have shown
that ﬁnancial insurance tends to have ecologically negative eﬀects. Horowitz and
Lichtenberg (1993, 1994a, 1994b) show that ﬁnancially insured farmers are likely
to undertake riskier production – with higher nitrogen and pesticide use – than
uninsured farmers do. A similar result is pointed out by Mahul (2001), assuming a
weather-based insurance.
In the trade-oﬀ between ﬁnancial insurance and natural insurance through agro-
biodiversity, a market failure problem arises from the fact that agro-biodiversity
does not only provide private on-farm beneﬁts, but also gives rise to public beneﬁts.
As a general result, the privately determined level of on-farm agro-biodiversity is
lower than the socially optimal one (Heal et al. 2004). In particular, such market
failure stems from the risk-changing characteristics of agro-biodiversity and risk-
averse behavior of private farmers (Baumg¨ artner 2007, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner
2008).
The literature on the provision of a public good under uncertainty suggests that
3private uncertainty and risk-aversion increase the eﬃciency of the private provision
of public goods (Bramoull´ e and Treich 2005, Sandler and Sterbenz 1990, Sandler et
al. 1987). The focus in this literature is on the properties of the utility function, while
the production of the public good (or public bad) is typically modelled in a trivial
way, i.e. one unit of money spent on providing the public good equals one unit of the
public good provided. In this paper, we study this issue in a more realistic settings in
which the production of a public good – such as agro-biodiversity’s public insurance
function – is generated in a complex system – such as a multi-scale ecological-
economic system.
This paper goes beyond existing studies in three respects: (i) the agro-ecosystem
is modelled in a more general manner; (ii) the focus here is on the question of how
increasing environmental risks aﬀect the trade-oﬀ between natural and ﬁnancial in-
surance as well as the underprovision of agro-biodiversity and social welfare; (iii)
we explicitly study the policy implications for regulating agricultural production,
thereby distinguishing between ex-ante and ex-post policy instruments under uncer-
tainty.
Our analysis is based on a stylized model. Crop yield on an individual farm is
random because of exogenous sources of environmental risk (e.g. weather, diseases
or pests); its statistical distribution (mean and variance) is determined by the level
of agro-biodiversity, and the variance may be increasing. The level of on-farm agro-
biodiversity not only determines the distribution of farm income, but also generates
an external beneﬁt to society at large in terms of a reduced risk in the provision
of public-good ecosystem services such as the regulation of pests, diseases, water
runoﬀ, or CO2 storage. The farmer is risk-averse and chooses the level of on-farm
agro-biodiversity so as to maximize the expected utility of farm income. When
making this choice, he has also access to ﬁnancial income insurance.
We show that increasing environmental risk leads private farmers to increase their
level of on-farm agro-biodiversity. Yet, the privately determined level of on-farm
agro-biodiversity is ineﬃciently low. We show that an ex-ante Pigouvian subsidy
on on-farm agro-biodiversity can cure this market failure problem. The subsidy
rate increases with public risk and decreases with private risk. Likewise, an ex-post
compensation payment for the actual provision of public environmental beneﬁts
can cure this market failure problem. We show that, if the individual farmer is
more risk-averse than society at large, the compensation payment should be smaller
than under certainty. If the market failure problem is not optimally regulated the
welfare eﬀect of increasing environmental risk is ambiguous. We show that for agro-
ecosystems with a high natural insurance function, low costs and large external
4beneﬁts of agro-biodiversity, welfare in the absence of regulation increases rather
than decreases with increasing environmental risk.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify the model. The
analysis and results are presented in Section 3, with all proofs and formal derivations
contained in the Appendix. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Model
We consider a farmer who manages an agro-ecosystem for the service, i.e. crop yield,
it provides. Due to stochastic ﬂuctuations in environmental conditions the provision
of the agro-ecosystem service is uncertain. Its statistical distribution depends on the
state of the agro-ecosystem in terms of agro-biodiversity, which is determined by
the farmer’s management decision. As a result, the statistical distribution of agro-
ecosystem service and, hence, of income depend on ecosystem management. At
the same time, agro-biodiversity determines the statistical distribution of ecosystem
services that accrue to society at large, i.e. to public-good ecosystem services. We
capture these relationships in a stylized model as follows.
2.1 Agro-ecosystem management
The farmer chooses a level v of agro-biodiversity by selecting a portfolio of diﬀerent
crop varieties. Given the level of agro-biodiversity v, the agro-ecosystem provides the
farmer with the desired service, i.e. total crop yield, at a level s which is random.
For simplicity we assume that the agro-ecosystem service directly translates into
monetary income and that its mean level Es = µ is independent of the level of
agro-biodiversity and constant.2 The variance of agro-ecosystem service depends on
the level of agro-biodiversity v as follows
vars = θσ
2(v) where σ
20(v) < 0 and σ
200(v) ≥ 0 . (1)
An increase in the parameter θ > 0 models a mean-preserving spread of risk (Roth-
schild and Stiglitz 1970). This allows us to discuss the private eﬀects of increased
environmental uncertainty in a convenient way. For illustrative purpose, we will
consider the following speciﬁc example:
σ
2(v) = σ0 v
1−η with η > 1 . (2)
2Empirical evidence suggests that µ may depend on v (see Section 1). We explored the impact
of such relationships in previous versions of the model. Here, we neglect such a dependence of µ
on v as it complicates the analysis while not adding further insights into the insurance dimension
of the issue under study.
5The constant η parameterizes the natural insurance capacity of the agro-ecosystem:3
the larger η, the stronger does the variance of agro-ecosystem service (total crop
yield) decline with the level of agro-biodiversity.
2.2 Financial insurance
In order to analyze the inﬂuence of availability of ﬁnancial insurance on the farmers’
choice of agro-biodiversity, we introduce ﬁnancial insurance in a simple and stylized
way. We assume that the farmer has the option of buying ﬁnancial insurance under
the following contract: (i) The farmer chooses the fraction a ∈ [0,1] of insurance
coverage. (ii) He receives (pays)
a(Es − s) (3)
from (to) the insurance company as an actuarially fair indemniﬁcation beneﬁt (in-
surance premium) if his realized income is below (above) the mean income.4 In order
to abstract from any problems related to informational asymmetry, we assume that
the statistical distribution as well as the actual level s of agro-ecosystem service
are observable to both insurant and insurance company. (iii) In addition to (3),
the farmer pays the transaction costs of insurance. The costs of insurance over and
above the actuarially fair insurance premium, which are a measure of the real costs
of insurance to the farmer, are assumed to follow the cost function
δ avars , (4)
where the parameter δ ≥ 0 describes how actuarially unfair is the insurance contract.
The costs increase linearly with the insured part of income variance. This captures
in the simplest way the idea that the costs of insurance increase with the extent of
insurance.
2.3 Farmer’s income, preferences and decision
The farmer chooses the level of agro-biodiversity v and ﬁnancial insurance cover-
age a. A higher level of agro-biodiversity carries costs c > 0 per unit of agro-
3For a formal motivation in terms of agro-biodiversity’s insurance value, see Section 3.1.
4This beneﬁt/premium-scheme is actuarially fair, because the insurance company has an ex-
pected net payment stream of E[a(Es − s)] = 0. This model of insurance is fully equivalent to
the traditional model of insurance (e.g. Ehrlich and Becker 1972: 627) where losses compared with
the maximum income are insured against and the insurant pays a constant insurance premium
irrespective of actual income. In this traditional model, the net payment would exactly amount to
(3); for a formal proof see Quaas and Baumg¨ artner (2008: Appendix A.1).
6biodiversity. These costs may be due to increased cropping, harvesting and mar-
keting eﬀort, and are purely private. Adding up income components, the farmer’s
(random) income y is given by
y = (1 − a)s − cv + aEs − δ avars . (5)
Since the agro-ecosystem service s is a random variable, net income y is a ran-
dom variable, too. The uncertain part of income is captured by the ﬁrst term in
Equation (5), while the other components are certain. Obviously, increasing a to
one allows the farmer to reduce the uncertain income component down to zero.
The mean Ey and the variance vary of the farmer’s income y are determined
by the mean and variance of agro-ecosystem service, which depends on the level of
agro-biodiversity (Equation 1),
Ey = µ − cv − δ aθσ
2(v) and (6)
vary = (1 − a)
2 θσ
2(v) . (7)
Mean income is given by the mean level of agro-ecosystem service µ, minus the
costs of agro-biodiversity cv and the costs of ﬁnancial insurance δ aθσ2(v). For an
actuarially fair ﬁnancial insurance contract (δ = 0), mean income equals mean net
income from agro-ecosystem use, µ − cv. The variance of income vanishes for full
ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a = 1, and equals the full variance of agro-ecosystem
service, θσ2(v), without any ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a = 0.
The farmer is assumed to be non-satiated and risk-averse with respect to his
uncertain income y. There exists empirical evidence on how agro-biodiversity in-
ﬂuences the mean and variance of agro-ecosystem services, but hardly on the full
statistical distribution. This restricts the class of risk preferences which can mean-
ingfully be represented in our model to utility functions which depend only on the
ﬁrst and second moment of the probability distribution, i.e. on the mean and the
variance. Speciﬁcally, we assume the following expected utility function, where ρ > 0
is a parameter describing the farmer’s degree of risk aversion (Arrow 1965, Pratt
1964):5




2.4 External beneﬁts of agro-biodiversity
The agro-ecosystem does not only provide the private ecosystem service crop-yield,
but also ecosystem services that have the characteristics of a public good, such as
5More general utility functions of the mean-variance type would complicate the analysis without
generating further insights.
7e.g. regulation of pests, diseases, water runoﬀ, or CO2 storage. Since these ecosys-
tem services depend on agro-biodiversity, the farmer’s private decision on the level of
agro-biodiversity v aﬀects not only his private income risk, as expressed by the vari-
ance of on-farm agro-ecosystem service, vars (Equation 1), but also causes external
eﬀects.
Let B(v) capture all beneﬁts of public-good ecosystem services that depend on
on-farm agro-biodiversity v. In particular, we assume that an external beneﬁt of on-
farm agro-biodiversity arises, as the uncertainty in the provision of public ecosystem
services is reduced by a higher level of agro-biodiversity.
EB(v) = Υ (9)
varB(v) = ΘΣ
2(v) where Σ
20(v) < 0 and Σ
200(v) ≥ 0 . (10)
For simplicity we assume – as in the case of the private ecosystem service – that the
mean level of the public ecosystem service is independent of on-farm biodiversity v.
By contrast, the variance of the public ecosystem service decreases with v, captur-
ing a natural insurance function of agro-biodiversity also for the public ecosystem
service. An increase in the parameter Θ > 0 models a mean-preserving spread of
risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). This allows us to discuss the public eﬀects of






where Ω > 0 is a parameter describing the degree of social risk aversion. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the private and the public risks associated with v are
uncorrelated, as they are associated with diﬀerent types of ecosystem services. The
total (i.e. private plus external) welfare eﬀect of on-farm agro-biodiversity, thus, is:6







3 Analysis and results
The analysis proceeds in four steps: First, we identify agro-biodiversity’s private
and public insurance value (Section 3.1). Next, we discuss the laissez-faire alloca-
tion which arises if the farmer individually maximizes expected utility from farm
income (Section 3.2). Then, we study the eﬃcient allocation which is obtained by




2 varB − γ cov(y,B).
8maximizing social welfare (Section 3.3). Finally, we investigate how policy measures
to internalize the externalities and welfare are inﬂuenced by increasing provate and
public environmental risks, as described by the parameters θ and Θ (Section 3.4).
3.1 The insurance value of agro-biodiversity
In order to precisely deﬁne the insurance value of agro-biodiversity, recall that
by choosing the level of agro-biodiversity v and the fraction of ﬁnancial insur-
ance coverage a the farmer actually chooses a particular income lottery, which in
our model is characterized by the mean Ey = µ − cv − δ aθσ2(v) and variance
var y = (1−a)2 θσ2(v) of income (Equations 6, 7). These are determined by v and
a and, therefore, one may speak of ‘the lottery (v,a)’.
One standard method of valuing the riskiness of a lottery to a decision maker is
to calculate the risk premium R of the lottery, which is deﬁned as the amount of
money that leaves the decision maker equally well oﬀ, in terms of utility, between
the two situations of (i) receiving for sure the expected pay-oﬀ from the lottery Ey
minus the risk premium R, and (ii) playing the risky lottery with random pay-oﬀ y
(e.g. Dasgupta and Heal 1979: 381, Kreps 1990: 84). With utility function (8), the





var y . (13)
In the model employed here the risk premium of the farmer’s income lottery thus







The insurance value of agro-biodiversity can now be deﬁned based on the risk pre-
mium of the lottery (v,a): The insurance value V v of agro-biodiversity v is given
by the change of the risk premium R of the lottery (v,a) due to a marginal change






Thus, the insurance value of agro-biodiversity is the marginal value of agro-biodiversity
in its function to reduce the risk premium of the farmer’s income risk from harvest-
ing uncertain agro-ecosystem services. Being a marginal value, it depends on the
existing level of agro-biodiversity v. It also depends on the actual level of ﬁnancial
insurance coverage a. The minus sign in the deﬁning Equation (15) serves to ex-
press agro-biodiversity’s ability to reduce the risk premium of the lottery (v,a) as a
9positive value. Applying Deﬁnition (15) to Equation (14), one obtains the following







20(v) > 0 . (16)
From Equation (16) it is apparent that the insurance value of agro-biodiversity has
an objective, a subjective and an institutional dimension. The objective dimension
is captured by the sensitivity of the variance of agro-ecosystem services to changes
in agro-biodiversity, θσ20; the subjective dimension is captured by the farmer’s de-
gree of risk aversion, ρ; and the institutional dimension is captured by the farmer’s
extent of ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a, which depends on institutional conditions
(see below). The insurance value of agro-biodiversity V v increases with the sen-
sitivity of the variance of agro-ecosystem services to changes in agro-biodiversity,
|θσ20|, and with the degree ρ of the farmer’s risk aversion. It decreases with the
farmer’s extent of ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a. In the extreme, for vanishing
subjective risk-aversion, ρ = 0, or for full ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a = 1,
agro-biodiversity’s insurance value vanishes. As a function of the level v of agro-
biodiversity, the insurance value V v(v,a) decreases: as agro-biodiversity becomes
more abundant (scarcer), its insurance value decreases (increases).
In the example of speciﬁcation (2), agro-biodiversity’s insurance value V v(v,a) is
isoelastic with respect to changes in the level of agro-biodiversity v, and η expresses
this elasticity.7 That is, an increase of agro-biodiversity by 1% always leads to an
increase of its insurance value by η%. This motivates the interpretation of η as the
agro-ecosystem’s natural insurance capacity.






With Expression (14) for the risk premium of the income lottery (v,a), the insurance
value V a(v,a) of ﬁnancial insurance is thus given by
V
a(v,a) = ρ(1 − a)θσ
2(v) . (18)
Similar to the insurance value of agro-biodiversity the insurance value of ﬁnancial in-
surance can be interpreted in terms of an objective, a subjective and an institutional
dimension.
So far, we have been discussing agro-biodiversity’s private insurance value to an




∂v /V v(v,a) ≡ η.
10farmer’s private income lottery. Beyond that, agro-biodiversity also has a public
insurance value. On-farm agro-biodiversity has an additional risk-reducing value



















20(v) > 0 . (20)
The total insurance value of on-farm agro-biodiversity then is the sum of the pri-
vate and the public insurance value. Similar to the private insurance value of
agro-biodiversity, the public insurance value depends on the properties of the agro-
ecosystem. In particular it depends on how agro-biodiversity reduces the risk in the
provision of the public ecosystem service. Also, the public insurance value increases
with the degree Ω of social risk aversion.
3.2 Laissez-faire allocation
As laissez-faire allocation (v?,a?) we consider the allocation in which the farmer
individually chooses the level of agro-biodiversity v and ﬁnancial insurance coverage
a such as to maximize expected utility (Equation 8) subject to constraints (6) and
(7). Formally, the farmer’s decision problem is
max







The laissez-faire allocation has the following properties.
Proposition 1
An (interior) laissez-faire allocation exists and is unique. It is characterized by the




?) − δ a
? θσ
20(v




?) = δ θσ
2(v
?) (23)
The laissez-faire level v? of agro-biodiversity increases with increasing private risk;
it is unaﬀected by increasing public risk; and the laissez-faire level a? of ﬁnancial












= 0 . (24)
11Proof: see Appendix A.1.
Condition (22) states that the farmer will choose the level of agro-biodiversity so
as to equate the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs of agro-biodiversity. The
marginal costs are given by the constant unit costs c on the right hand side. The
marginal beneﬁts are given by the expression on the left hand side and comprise
two terms: the (private) insurance value of agro-biodiversity and the reduction in
payments for ﬁnancial insurance that results from the reduced variance of agro-
ecosystem service due to a marginal increase in agro-biodiversity.
Likewise, Condition (23) states that the level of ﬁnancial insurance coverage is
chosen so as to equate the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs of ﬁnancial
insurance, where the marginal beneﬁt is the insurance value and the marginal costs
are the (marginal) transaction costs.
As diﬀerent forms of insurance, natural insurance from agro-biodiversity and ﬁ-
nancial insurance are substitutes: as ﬁnancial insurance becomes more expensive,
i.e. δ increases, the farmer reduces his demand for ﬁnancial insurance coverage and
increases his level of agro-biodiversity. Put the other way: as ﬁnancial insurance be-
comes cheaper, it drives out agro-biodiversity as the natural insurance. In any case,
with ﬁnancial insurance available, the farmer will choose a level of agro-biodiversity
which is below the one that he would choose if ﬁnancial insurance was not available.8
An increase in the private risk, θ, leads the farmer to choose a higher level of agro-
biodiversity, v?, as this provides him with increased natural insurance (Result 24).
It does not lead the farmer, however, to choose a higher level of ﬁnancial insurance
coverage. The reason is that in the model of ﬁnancial insurance considered here
(cf. Section 2.2) the actuarially fair insurance premium is based on the extent of
risk, so that with increasing risk the premium is also increasing. This increase in
the real costs of insurance exactly counter-balances the increased need for ﬁnancial
insurance coverage, so that a change in the private risk, θ, does overall not have any
impact on the demand for ﬁnancial insurance, a?.
An increase in public risk, Θ, has no eﬀect on a farmer’s private decision, as it
purely aﬀects the external beneﬁts, and not the private beneﬁts, of on-farm agro-
biodiversity.
8This level can be determined from setting a = 0 in Problem (21) and maximizing over v. It is
strictly smaller than v? for all δ < ρ and equals v? for δ ≥ ρ, i.e. in cases where ﬁnancial insurance
is so expensive that an optimizing farmer would not buy it. See Appendix A.1 for details.
123.3 Eﬃcient allocation
The eﬃcient allocation (ˆ v,ˆ a) is derived by choosing the level of agro-biodiversity v
and ﬁnancial insurance coverage a such as to maximize total welfare (Equation 12),
subject to Constraints (6), (7), (9) and (10):
max











The eﬃcient allocation has the following properties.
Proposition 2
An (interior) solution to problem (25) exists and is unique. It is characterized by
the following necessary and suﬃcient conditions:
V
v(ˆ v,ˆ a) + V
pub(ˆ v) − δ ˆ aθσ
20(ˆ v) = c (26)
V
a(ˆ v,ˆ a) = δ θσ
2(ˆ v) (27)
The eﬃcient level ˆ v of agro-biodiversity increases with both increasing private and
increasing public risk, and the eﬃcient level ˆ a of ﬁnancial insurance coverage is












= 0 . (28)
Proof: see Appendix A.2
The properties of the eﬃcient allocation are similar in structure to those of the
laissez-faire allocation (cf. Proposition 1). The diﬀerence between the eﬃcient and
the laissez-faire allocation is that in the eﬃcient allocation the positive externality
that on-farm agro-biodiversity has on society at large in terms of a reduced variance
of public beneﬁts is fully captured: ﬁrst order condition (26), which demands equal-
ity of marginal beneﬁts and costs of agro-biodiversity, includes not only the private
insurance value but also the public insurance value of agro-biodiversity.
Accordingly, the eﬃcient level of agro-biodiversity increases not only with an
increase in private risk, θ, but also with an increase in public risk, Θ.
3.4 Welfare eﬀects of increasing environmental risks
Comparing the laissez-faire allocation (cf. Proposition 1) with the eﬃcient alloca-
tion (cf. Proposition 2), it becomes apparent that there is market failure: Due to
the external beneﬁt of on-farm agro-biodiversity, the laissez-faire allocation is not
eﬃcient. In the laissez-faire allocation a private farmer chooses a level of agro-
biodiversity that is too low compared to the socially optimal level because he does
13not take into account the positive externality on society at large. As a result, welfare
is lower in the laissez-faire allocation than in the eﬃcient allocation.
Proposition 3
The laissez-faire level of agro-biodiversity is lower than the eﬃcient level, while the
level of ﬁnancial insurance coverage is the same in both allocations. As a result,
laissez-faire welfare is lower than welfare in the eﬃcient allocation.
v
? < ˆ v , (29)
a
? = ˆ a , (30)
W
? < ˆ W . (31)
Proof: see Appendix A.3
3.4.1 Ex-ante Pigouvian subsidy
In order to implement the eﬃcient allocation, a regulator could impose a Pigouvian
subsidy on agro-biodiversity. Denoting by τ the subsidy per unit of actually em-
ployed agro-biodiversity v, which is set prior to the resolvement of uncertainty in
the provision of the private and public ecosystem service (hence: ex-ante subsidy),
the optimization problem of a private farmer under such regulation reads
max






2(v) + τ v . (32)
Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for the eﬃcient allocation (Problem 25) and
for the regulated allocation (Problem 32), we obtain the optimal subsidy rate ˆ τ.
Proposition 4
The eﬃcient allocation is implemented if a subsidy rate ˆ τ on agro-biodiversity is set
with




20(ˆ v) > 0 . (33)
The optimal subsidy rate increases with increasing public risk, Θ, and decreases






< 0 . (34)
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
The Pigouvian subsidy rate ˆ τ captures the positive externality of on-farm agro-
biodiversity on society at large. It is exactly given by agro-biodiversity’s public
insurance value (Equation 20). Hence, the optimal subsidy rate is higher, the higher
the public insurance beneﬁts of agro-biodiversity are.
14The optimal subsidy rate ˆ τ can be interpreted as a measure of the extent of regu-
lation necessary to internalize the externality, i.e. to solve the public-good problem.
Thus, it can also be interpreted as a measure of the size of the externality. The size
of the externality depends on the extent of private and public risk, θ and Θ, because
the level of agro-biodiversity depends on the risk faced by the farmer and, hence,
on the level of natural insurance by agro-biodiversity he chooses.
Increasing risks have a clear-cut eﬀect on the size of the externality. Condi-
tion (34) states that the optimal subsidy rate – that is, the size of the externality
– decreases with increasing private risk, θ. The intuitive reason for this result is
that the farmer uses natural insurance to a greater extent the larger his private risk
is. For that purpose he provides more on-farm agro-biodiversity thus also providing
more of the public good. As a consequence, the externality decreases. Increasing
public risk, Θ, has two eﬀects: as a direct eﬀect, the public insurance value of a given
level of agro-biodiversity increases (see Section 3.1). This eﬀect increases the size
of the externality that exactly equals the public insurance value (Equation 33). As
an indirect eﬀect, the eﬃcient level of on-farm agro-biodiversity increases. Similar
to the case of increasing private risk, this eﬀect reduces the size of the externality.
Proposition 4 shows that the direct eﬀect unambiguously dominates the indirect ef-
fect of increasing public risk. Hence, the size of the externality increases with public
risk (Result 34).
3.4.2 Ex-post compensation
The Pigouvian subsidy on agro-biodiversity derived in Proposition 4 is a payment
that does not involve any uncertainty for the farmer. Such a policy may be called
an ex-ante policy, as on-farm agro-biodiversity is subsidized for its ex-ante expected
external beneﬁt independently of the actual (uncertain) outcome. As an alternative
policy instrument we consider a payment to the farmer in proportion to the actually
occurring external beneﬁt of on-farm agro-biodiversity after uncertainty is resolved.
Such a scheme may be regarded as an ex-post compensation policy, as the farmer is
paid after uncertainty is resolved.
To directly pay the farmer for the public ecosystem services the agro-ecosystem
provides has been frequently proposed as a policy instrument under conditions of
certainty (e.g. Hanley and Oglethorpe 1999). Here, we investigate how such a scheme
works under conditions of uncertainty. The farmer would receive a payment β B(v)
in proportion to the actually realised external beneﬁt B(v) derived from the public
ecosystem service after uncertainty is resolved, where β is some positive number.
The farmer would receive less than the public beneﬁt, if β < 1, more if β > 1
15and exactly the public beneﬁt if β = 1. Note that the payment to the farmer is
uncertain, as the external beneﬁt of the public ecosystem service is uncertain, with
EB(v) = Υ and varB(v) = ΘΣ2(v) (Equations 9 and 10). Under this policy, the
farmer’s optimization problem is
max
v,a















Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for the eﬃcient allocation (Problem 25) and
for the farmer’s optimal decision on agro-biodiversity (Problem 35), we obtain the
following result
Proposition 5
The eﬃcient allocation is implemented if and only if the farmer receives a payment
of β B(v) for the public ecosystem service after uncertainty is resolved, with
ˆ β = Ω/ρ . (36)
Proof: see Appendix A.5.
According to Proposition 5 the farmer should receive a payment of ˆ β B(v) = Ω/ρB(v)
that is smaller than the external beneﬁt B(v) from the ecosystem service if he is
more risk-averse than society at large (ρ > Ω). The reason is that, if payment
to the farmer was at the full level of the external beneﬁt he would supply more
agro-biodiversity, involving higher costs of agro-biodiversity, than socially optimal.
Only if the farmer’s individual degree of risk aversion equals society’s degree of risk
aversion, ρ = Ω, the farmer should be paid the full external beneﬁt of on-farm agro-
biodiversity. That is, only if the farmer and society at large are equally risk averse
the same result is obtained under uncertainty as under conditions of certainty.
Under the optimal ex-post compensation scheme the farmer enjoys an additional














Hence, the additional marginal expected utility due to the optimal ex-post policy
(Equation 37) is exactly equal to the optimal subsidy rate ˆ τ under the ex-ante policy
(Equation 33). In this sense, the ex-ante policy and the ex-post policy are equivalent
and both lead to the ﬁrst-best allocation.
3.4.3 Laissez-faire welfare
After having studied the eﬀect of increasing risks on the size of the externality, we
now turn to the question of how increasing risks inﬂuence welfare. In a ﬁrst-best
16world, where the externality is perfectly internalized, e.g. by the ex-ante Pigouvian
subsidy (33) or the ex-post compensation (36), the answer to this question is simple:
higher levels of both private and public risk are always welfare decreasing when both
farmers and society at large are risk-averse.9
This is not necessarily the case in the second-best world of the laissez-faire allo-
cation where the externality of on-farm agro-biodiversity is present. Welfare in the
laissez-faire allocation is given by (Equation 12 with 6, 7, 9 and 10)
W
? ≡ µ + Υ − cv
















We can immediately determine the impact of increasing public risk on laissez-faire
welfare: Since society is risk-averse, increasing public risk decreases welfare. Since
increasing public risk has no eﬀect on the laissez-faire allocation (Proposition 1),
there is no indirect eﬀect that could reduce or even reverse this negative eﬀect.




< 0 . (39)
Whether laissez-faire welfare increases or decreases with private risk, θ, depends on
the relative size of two eﬀects: (i) the direct eﬀect of increased private risk is always
negative (this is the only eﬀect present in the ﬁrst best); (ii) the indirect eﬀect
that increased private risk leads to an increased level of agro-biodiversity is positive
(Proposition 1). The condition for whether one or the other eﬀect dominates is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
With increasing private risk welfare in the laissez-faire allocation decreases / is




















Proof: see Appendix A.6.
The right-hand side of Condition (40) expresses the direct eﬀect of increasing
private risk: the higher private risk, the higher are the costs of ﬁnancial insurance
(the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of 40) and the higher is the risk-premium of
income from crop yield (the second term on the right hand side of 40). This direct
eﬀect decreases welfare. The left-hand side of Condition (40) captures the indirect
9This follows from applying the envelope theorem on welfare (Equation 12) with respect to θ
and Θ.
17eﬀect of increasing private risk that on-farm biodiversity increases in the laissez-
faire equilibrium (Proposition 1). This indirect eﬀect leads to improved welfare, as
the size of the externality is decreased (Proposition 4). The overall welfare eﬀect
depends on the balance between these two eﬀects. In particular, if the indirect eﬀect
is suﬃciently large welfare in the laissez-faire even increases with increasing private
risk.
Using the conditions for the laissez-faire equilibrium (Proposition 1), Condi-
tion (40) can be expressed in the fundamental parameters of the model, and in
terms of the public insurance value of agro-biodiversity (see Appendix A.6). We
obtain the following alternative formulation of Proposition 6.
Proposition 60
With increasing private risk welfare in the laissez-faire allocation decreases / is
unchanged / increases, i.e. dW ?/dθ < = > 0, if and only if
V
pub(v





The left hand side of Condition (41) is the public (marginal) beneﬁt, i.e. the pub-
lic insurance value, of agro-biodiversity. Other things equal, with a larger public
insurance value laissez-faire welfare is more likely to increase with private risk.
The ﬁrst factor on the right-hand side of Condition (41) are the marginal costs of
agro-biodiversity. Other things equal, laissez-faire welfare is more likely to increase
with private risk the lower the marginal costs of agro-biodiversity are.
The second factor on the right-hand side of Condition (41) expresses the agro-
ecosystem’s natural insurance function. In the example of an agro-ecosystem with








As η increases from 1 to inﬁnity, this factor decreases from inﬁnity to 1. Hence,
the larger the agro-ecosystem’s natural insurance capacity, the smaller is this factor.
Given the public insurance value of biodiversity and the costs of agro-biodiversity,
a larger agro-ecosystem’s natural insurance capacity increases the likelihood that
laissez-faire welfare increases with increasing private risk.
To summarize, Condition (41) states that laissez-faire welfare W ? decreases with
private risk θ if the agro-ecosystem is characterized by a low public insurance value,
high marginal costs of agro-biodiversity and a low natural insurance capacity of the
agro-ecosystem. Under these circumstances, the negative direct eﬀect of private
18risk to private farmers dominates over its positive indirect eﬀect of increased agro-
biodiversity. So, an increase in private risk decreases total welfare. Interestingly,
the reverse may also happen in the second-best world where the agro-biodiversity
externality is not internalized: an increase in private risk may increase total welfare.
This holds for an the agro-ecosystem and economic conditions that are characterized
by a high natural insurance capacity, low costs and a high public insurance value
of agro-biodiversity. Under these circumstances, the positive indirect eﬀect, i.e. an
increase in the level of agro-biodiversity and in the associated public and private
insurance value, outweighs the negative direct eﬀect of increased private risk.
4 Conclusions
We have studied how a risk-averse farmer manages his portfolio of agro-biodiversity
so as to hedge his income risk. Our analysis captures two stylized facts: (i) On-
farm agro-biodiversity provides beneﬁts not just at the farm level, but also provides
external beneﬁts. (ii) The variance of private and public beneﬁts decreases with the
level of agro-biodiversity. Thus, agro-biodiversity has both a private and a public
natural insurance value.
Increasing environmental risks lead to a higher level of on-farm agro-biodiversity,
because farmers use biodiversity’s natural insurance function to a greater extent.
Yet, due to the external beneﬁts of on-farm agro-biodiversity, the laissez-faire al-
location is not eﬃcient. In order to study how this market failure is aﬀected by
increasing environmental risks we have analyzed how (i) the extent of regulation
necessary to implement the eﬃcient allocation and (ii) welfare in the laissez-faire
allocation depend on the risk associated with the private and the public ecosystem
service.
We found that the ex-ante Pigouvian subsidy, as a measure of the extent of
eﬃcient regulation in a ﬁrst-best world, unambiguously decreases with the risk as-
sociated with the private ecosystem service (crop yield), and increases with the risk
associated with the public ecosystem service. Likewise, an ex-post compensation
payment can cure this market failure problem. We have shown that, if the indi-
vidual farmer is more risk-averse than society at large, the compensation payment
should be smaller than under certainty.
We also found that in a second-best world where such regulation does not exist,
or is not properly enforced, it is even possible that increased private risk increases
welfare. While this is, in principle, well-known from second-best theory, we have
derived a speciﬁc condition on agro-ecosystem functioning under which this hap-
19pens: increased private risk will have a positive impact on total welfare if the agro-
ecosystem is characterized by a high natural insurance capacity, the marginal costs
of agro-biodiversity are low, and its public insurance value is high.
These results are very relevant for agricultural and environmental policy. First,
the socially optimal management of increasing environmental risks requires the opti-
mal internalization of the environmental externality associated with agro-biodiversity.
Existence of actuarially fair insurance against environmental risk is not suﬃcient
for that sake. Second, the optimal policy response crucially depends on whether
it is the private or the public environmental risk that is increasing. If the public
environmental risk is increasing environmental policy (i.e. the ex-ante subsidy on
on-farm agro-biodiversity) needs to be reinforced, and if the private environmental
risk is increasing environmental policy needs to be relaxed. Third, insofar as direct
compensation payments are used to stipulate farmers to provide uncertain public
environmental beneﬁts, and individual farmers are more risk-averse than society at
large, compensation payments should be lower than the payments derived under
the assumption of certainty. Fourth, if an optimal environmental regulation is not
in place, welfare may be increasing or decreasing with increasing private risk. Yet,
even in the case of increasing welfare, this is welfare-inferior to optimal environ-
mental regulation. So, our result that laissez-faire welfare may be increasing due to
increasing environmental risks should not be taken as an excuse for policy inaction.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Written down explicitly, the ﬁrst order conditions (22) and (23) for the interior















?) = δ θσ
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?) (A.2)
Condition (A.2) can be solved to
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Diﬀerentiating (A.3) with respect to ρ and δ is straight forward and yields expres-
sions for da?/dρ and da?/dδ. As a?, according to Condition (A.3), does not depend
on θ or Θ one has da?/dθ = da?/dΘ = 0.
24A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Written down explicitly, the ﬁrst order conditions (26) and (27) for the interior
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ρ(1 − ˆ a)θσ
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Condition (A.13) can be solved to
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Diﬀerentiating (A.14) with respect to ρ and δ is straight forward and yields expres-
sions for dˆ a/dρ and dˆ a/dδ. As ˆ a, according to Condition (A.14), does not depend
on Ω, θ or Θ one has dˆ a/dΩ = dˆ a/dθ = dˆ a/dΘ = 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) From Conditions (A.3) and (A.14) it is apparent that a? = ˆ a.
(ii) As a? = ˆ a, Conditions (22) and (26) can be interpreted as equations of
functions of the single variable v that determine the levels of v? and ˆ v, respectively.
Both conditions have as their right-hand side the constant c, and as their left-hand
side a strictly decreasing function of v, so that v? and ˆ v are uniquely determined.
As the term V pub(v) = −Ω
2 ΘΣ20(v) is strictly positive for all v, the left-hand side of
Condition (26) is strictly greater than the left-hand side of Condition (22) for all v.
As a result the value of v that equates the left-hand side with the right-hand side is
strictly greater for Condition (26) than for Condition (22), i.e. ˆ v > v?.
(iii) ˆ W ≥ W ? by deﬁnition of the eﬃcient allocation as the allocation that
maximizes W. Strict inequality follows from strict concavity of W in ˆ v and ˆ v > v?.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The ﬁrst order conditions for the interior solution of Problem (32), which are ob-
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Comparison of Condition (A.25) with Condition (A.12) reveals that
v





26Employing results (A.16), (A.18), (A.20), (A.22) and (A.24), the comparative statics
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The ﬁrst order conditions for the interior solution of Problem (35), which are ob-
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Comparison of Condition (A.33) with Condition (A.12) reveals that
v
? = ˆ v for β = Ω/ρ. (A.35)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6



































































27Using (16) and (20), this leads to
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Using (A.1) yields Condition (41).
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